

site the town, and the other two miles below, near the mouth of Deep Run—and early on the morning of the 11th of December the work was begun under cover of a dense fog. A bridge was laid at the mouth of Deep Run, and Franklin's grand division passed over without opposition. In front of Fredericksburg, however, the case was different. The gallant Barksdale with his brigade of Mississippians, to whom the defence of the town had been assigned, repelled every attempt to construct the bridges until the afternoon, when the powerful artillery of the Federal army was massed and a cannonade from one hundred and eighty guns was opened upon the devoted town, under cover of which troops crossed in boats under the direction of General Hunt, chief of artillery. Then Barksdale, fighting, retired step by step until he gained the cover of the road embankment at the foot of Marye's Heights, which he held until relieved by fresh troops. Burnside having developed his plan of attack, Lee concentrated his forces preparatory for battle. His right rested on the Massaponax, and his left on the Rappahannock at the dam in the vicinity of Falmouth. Jackson's corps, in three lines, occupied the space between the Massaponax and Deep Run, while Longstreet's corps, with artillery, occupied the remainder of the position. The flanks were covered by Stuart's cavalry and horse artillery. It was here for the first time that the Confederate artillery was systematically massed for battle. On his arrival at Fredericksburg, General Lee assigned to Colonel Long the duty of verifying and selecting positions for the artillery, in which he was assisted by Majors Venable and Talcott and Captain Sam Johnson. On the day of battle two hundred pieces of artillery were in position, and so arranged that at least fifty pieces could be brought to bear on any threatened point, and on Fredericksburg and Deep Run, the points of attack, a hundred guns could be concentrated. The artillery on Longstreet's front was commanded by Colonels Alexander, Walton, and Cabell, and that on Jackson's by Colonels Brown and Walker. The horse artillery was commanded by Major Pelham. These officers on all occasions served with marked ability. General Pendleton, chief of artillery, exercised special control of the reserve artillery.

As Jackson's corps had been extended some distance down the Rappahannock, it was not until the night of the 11th that its concentration was completed. On the morning of the 12th of December, General Lee's entire force was in position, prepared to receive the Federal attack. The strength of the opposing armies, as on previous occasions, was disproportionate. The effective strength of the Army of Northern Virginia was about 60,000, of which about 52,000 were infantry, 4000 artillery with 250 guns, and the cavalry composed the remainder. That of the Army of the Potomac exceeded 100,000 men and 300 pieces of artillery. 90,000 men had crossed the river—40,000 of Sumner's grand division at Fredericksburg, and Franklin's grand division of 50,000 men at Deep Run. From this disposition of forces it was apparent that General Burnside designed a simultaneous attack upon the Confederate right and centre. Jackson's first line, composed of two brigades of A. P. Hill's division, held the railroad; a second line, consisting of artillery and the other brigades of Hill's division, occupied the heights immediately overlooking the railroad; and the reserves, commanded by D. H. Hill, were in convenient supporting-distance. In the centre the most conspicuous feature was Marye's Heights, behind the town of Fredericksburg and separated from it by an open space of several hundreds yards in width. The telegraph road passing between the base of the heights and a strong embankment was occupied by two brigades—Cobb's and Kershaw's of Longstreet's corps—while the crest was crowned by a powerful artillery covered by a continuous line of earthworks. A reserve of two brigades, commanded by Brigadier-general Ransom, occupied the reverse slope of the heights. [These troops did good service during the battle.] On the hills behind were grouped batteries so disposed that the heights in front could be raked with shot and shell in case they were carried by the Federals.

On the morning of the 13th of December, as the fog slowly lifted, a scene was unfolded which in point of grandeur has seldom been witnessed. The Stafford Heights, from Falmouth to the Massaponax, were crowned with thickly-grouped batteries of artillery, while the shores of the Rappahannock were cov-

ered with dark masses of troops in battle array. Opposite the Confederate right the attacking force, in two lines, began to advance. Simultaneously the heights were wreathed in smoke and the thunder of artillery announced the commencement of battle. When the attacking column had become disengaged from the embankments of the river-road, Stuart's horse artillery on the right and the artillery of Jackson's corps in front opened a destructive fire, which checked it for a brief space, until its own batteries could be placed in position to occupy the opposing artillery. It then moved steadily onward, and quickly dislodged the first Confederate line from the railroad, and disappeared in the wood that concealed the greater part of the second line. A deadly conflict ensued, which, although hidden by the forest, was proclaimed by the terrific clash of musketry. Very soon the troops that had advanced so gallantly were seen to retire. At first a straggling few and then large masses came rushing out, followed by long lines of gray veterans, who dealt death at every step. General Meade, from the want of support after his gallant achievement, was compelled to witness the present deplorable condition of his corps. Forty thousand of Franklin's grand division, remaining idly by, had beheld the defeat of their brave comrades without extending a helping hand. This apathy of Franklin was at the time regarded by the Confederates as remarkable.

During the attack on the right preparations were in progress to assail the Confederate centre. Dense masses of troops, which had been previously concentrated in and about Fredericksburg, were now formed in columns of attack to be led against Marye's Heights. About noon the attack commenced. Column after column advanced to the assault, to be hurled back with terrible slaughter. Attack after attack was hopelessly renewed until the stoutest heart quailed at the dreadful carnage that ensued. Seeing his repeated efforts unavailing, General Burnside ordered a discontinuance of the conflict. The Confederates on the next day expected the battle to be renewed with greater vigor than had been displayed on the day before, but the Federals maintained a sullen silence, and at night recrossed the Rappahannock. The next morning the spectator could hardly be-

lieve his senses on beholding the great Federal army that had on the day previous lined the southern shore of the Rappahannock now covering the heights of Stafford, bereft of that martial spirit it had exhibited a few days before. The dispirited condition of the Federal army was not so much the consequence of losses in battle as the effect of the want of co-operation and the fruitless results of misdirected valor.

The appointment of General Burnside to the command of the Army of the Potomac had proved a mistake—more, however, from the combination of circumstances against him than from lack of conduct on his part. His successes in North Carolina had given him prominence, while his soldierly bearing and fine appearance evidently had their influence with Mr. Lincoln in the selection of him as commander-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac; while neglecting the superior claims of several others, two of whom—Generals Hooker and Franklin—could never forget their sense of superiority sufficiently to render him cordial co-operation. Bourrienne gives us a maxim of Bonaparte that “two great generals in the same army are sure to make a bad one.” This maxim particularly applied in the present instance to the Army of the Potomac, where its truth was fully verified.

The losses sustained, as stated by General Burnside, amounted to about 10,000, among whom was General Bayard, a young officer of great merit, whose loss was sincerely felt in the army as well as by a large circle of acquaintances. The Confederate loss was numerically much less than that sustained by the enemy. The Confederates, however, numbered among their slain Brigadier-generals Gregg and Cobb, and among their mortally wounded Colonel Coleman of the artillery. The fall of these noble and gallant spirits was deeply deplored by the army.

In preparation for this battle General Lee had established his field headquarters on a spur of the ridge on which he had located his line of battle. From this position he had a commanding view of the adjacent valley, the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg to Massaponax, and the Stafford Heights beyond. This spur has since been known as Lee's Hill. On the day of battle Longstreet had his headquarters at the same place,

so that Lee was able to keep his hand on the rein of his "old war-horse" and to direct him where to apply his strength.

After the battle of Fredericksburg, General Lee retained his headquarters, established previous to the battle, at a point on the road midway between Fredericksburg and Hamilton Crossing, selected on account of its accessibility. Although there was a vacant house near which he could have occupied, he preferred, as in the instance we have recently given, to remain in camp, thus giving an example of endurance of hardship that might prove useful to his troops. The headquarters did not present a very imposing appearance. It consisted of four or five wall tents and three or four common tents, situated on the edge of an old pine field, and not far from a fine grove of forest trees, from which was obtained an abundant supply of excellent wood, while the branches of the old field-pine served to fortify the tents against the cold of winter and to make shelter for the horses. Though outwardly the winter quarters presented rather a dismal aspect, yet within cheerfulness prevailed. Notwithstanding the responsibility of his position and the difficulties that surrounded him, General Lee usually maintained a cheerful mien toward his staff, and at times indulged his humor for a practical joke in a manner which would have surprised an outsider who saw only the grave and dignified side of his character. As a companion-piece to the demijohn story previously told, we may give another in which General Lee was the active agent. On one occasion a demijohn was observed to be carried into his tent, which excited in the minds of those who beheld it visions of good wine or brandy. (The general well knew that several of his staff enjoyed a glass of wine, or even something stronger.) About twelve o'clock he walked out of his tent, and with a twinkle in his eye remarked, "Perhaps you gentlemen would like a glass of something?" All assenting, he directed Bryan, the steward of the mess, to carry the demijohn to the mess-tent and arrange cups for the gentlemen. They followed him with pleasant anticipations of the unexpected treat. The general ordered the cork to be drawn and the cups filled. The disappointment of the expectants and Lee's enjoyment may be better imagined than described when

the contents proved to be buttermilk. On another occasion he was much amused at the dissatisfaction expressed one morning at breakfast by a member of his staff at the tough biscuits, and at another's remarking, "You ought not to mind that ; they will stick by you all the longer." It was a time when great scarcity of provisions prevailed throughout the army, and all were glad to get even a little fried bacon and tough biscuits, with cold water for a beverage: sugar and coffee were unknown luxuries.

We were frequently visited by distinguished personages from Richmond and elsewhere. Among those deserving of especial mention were Colonel Freemantle of the British army and Captain Scheibert of the Prussian engineers. Scheibert remained with us for some time; he was present at the battle of Chancellorsville, and accompanied us to Gettysburg, where Colonel Freemantle was also present. Both of these officers were highly esteemed at headquarters.

Having for some time been reduced to very meagre fare, we were rejoiced to receive a present of a lot of chickens. One of the hens so distinguished herself as to be worthy of a place in history. Bryan, the steward of General Lee's mess, having discovered that she daily contributed an egg, spared her life. She proved to be a very discriminating hen, for she selected the general's tent to make her daily deposit. Instinct seemed to teach her that he was fond of fowls and domestic animals. Every day she would walk to and fro in front of his tent, and when all was quiet walk in, find a place under his bed, and deposit her egg ; then walk out with a gratified cackle. Appreciating her partiality for him, he would leave his tent-door open for her to come in. This she kept up daily for weeks, Bryan always securing her contributions for the general's breakfast. She chose a roosting-place in the baggage-wagon, and on breaking up camp to meet Hooker at Chancellorsville, Bryan found room in the wagon for the hen. During the battle she seemed too much disturbed to lay, but as soon as the engagement was over she fell at once into her regular routine. She accompanied the army to Gettysburg. One night, when preparing for retreat, with the wagon loaded and every-

thing ready, the question was raised, "Where is the hen?" By that time everybody knew her and took an interest in her; search was made in every direction, even General Lee joining in it. She was found at last perched on the wagon, where she had taken her place of her own accord. She accompanied the army in all its marches and countermarches for more than a year, and finally came to rather an unsentimental end. In the winter of 1864, General Lee's headquarters was near Orange Court-house. The hen had become rather fat and lazy, and on one occasion, when the general had a distinguished visitor to dine with him, Bryan, finding it extremely difficult to procure material for a dinner, very inhumanly killed the hen, unknown to any of the staff. At the dinner the general was very much surprised to see so fine a fowl; all enjoyed it, not dreaming of the great sacrifice made upon the altar of hospitality. When she was missed and inquiry made, Bryan had to acknowledge that he had killed her in order to provide something for the gentlemen's dinner.

Several highly interesting letters written by General Lee to his wife and daughters at the period considered in the present chapter have been kindly handed to the writer with permission to publish them. As they possess both a personal and public significance, with some amusing comments upon army matters, he takes pleasure in laying them before the reader. General Lee's devotion to his family, his religious faith, and his sense of humor are all here strongly displayed. No better introduction can be offered than a sentence from a letter written by Miss Mildred Lee in reference to these letters: In them "one has glimpses of a great war raging mercilessly, while the chief actor sits down, to the sound of shot and cannon, and pours out his heart in affection to his 'little daughters.' "

From a letter to his daughter Mildred, written on Christmas, 1862, we make the following extract:

"I cannot tell you how I long to see you when a little quiet occurs. My thoughts revert to you, your sisters and mother; my heart aches for our reunion. Your brothers I see occasionally. This morning Fitzhugh rode by with his young aide-de-camp (Rob) at the head of his brigade, on his way up the Rap-

pahannock. You must study hard, gain knowledge, and learn your duty to God and your neighbor: that is the great object of life. I have no news, confined constantly to camp and my thoughts occupied with its necessities and duties. I am, however, happy in the knowledge that General Burnside and his army will not eat their promised Xmas dinner in Richmond to-day."

On the succeeding day he writes as follows to his daughter Agnes:

"CAMP FREDERICKSBURG, 26th December, 1862.

"MY PRECIOUS LITTLE AGNES: I have not heard of you for a long time. I wish you were with me, for, always solitary, I am sometimes weary, and long for the reunion of my family once again. But I will not speak of myself, but of you. . . . I have only seen the ladies in this vicinity when flying from the enemy, and it caused me acute grief to witness their exposure and suffering. But a more noble spirit was never displayed anywhere. The faces of old and young were wreathed with smiles and glowed with happiness at their sacrifices for the good of their country. Many have lost *everything*. What the fire and shells of the enemy spared their pillagers destroyed. But God will shelter them, I know. So much heroism will not be unregarded. I can only hold oral communication with your sister, and have forbidden the scouts to bring any writing, and have taken back some that I had given them for her. If caught it would compromise them. They only convey messages. I learn in that way she is well. . . .

"Your devoted father,

"R. E. LEE.

"To AGNES LEE."

We add two other letters, one written to his daughter Agnes, and one to Mrs. Lee:

"CAMP FREDERICKSBURG, 6th February, 1863.

"TO AGNES LEE: I read yesterday, my precious daughter, your letter, and grieved very much when last in Richmond at not seeing you. My movements are so uncertain that I cannot

be relied on for anything. The only place I am to be found is in camp, and I am so cross now that I am not worth seeing anywhere. Here you will have to take me with the three stools—the snow, the rain, and the mud. The storm of the last twenty-four hours has added to our stock of all, and we are now in a floating condition. But the sun and wind will carry all off in time, and then we shall appreciate our relief. Our horses and mules suffer the most. They have to bear the cold and rain, tug through the mud, and suffer all the time with hunger. The roads are wretched, almost impassable. I heard of Mag lately. One of our scouts brought me a card of Margaret Stuart's, with a pair of gauntlets directed to 'Cousin Robert.' . . . . I have no news. General Hooker is obliged to do something: I do not know what it will be. He is playing the Chinese game, trying what frightening will do. He runs out his guns, starts his wagons and troops up and down the river, and creates an excitement generally. Our men look on in wonder, give a cheer, and all again subsides *in statu quo ante bellum*. I wish you were here with me to-day. You would have to sit by this little stove, look out at the rain, and keep yourself dry. But here come, in all their wet, the adjutant-generals with the papers. I must stop and go to work. See how kind God is: we have plenty to do in good weather and bad. . . . .

"Your devoted father,

"R. E. LEE."

*Extract from Letter to Mrs. Lee.*

"CAMP FREDERICKSBURG, 23d February, 1863.

"The weather now is very hard upon our poor bushmen. This morning the whole country is covered with a mantle of snow fully a foot deep. It was nearly up to my knees as I stepped out this morning, and our poor horses were enveloped. We have dug them out and opened our avenues a little, but it will be terrible and the roads impassable. No cars from Richmond yesterday. I fear our short rations for man and horse will have to be curtailed. Our enemies have their troubles

too. They are very strong immediately in front, but have withdrawn their troops above and below us back toward Acquia Creek. I owe Mr. F. J. Hooker no thanks for keeping me here. He ought to have made up his mind long ago what to do.—*24th*. The cars have arrived, and brought me a young French officer full of vivacity, and ardent for service with me. I think the appearance of things will cool him. If they do not, the night will, for he brought no blankets.

“R. E. LEE.”

## CHAPTER XIV.

### *CHANCELLORSVILLE.*

Conscript Act passed.—Deficiency of Army Stores.—Lee's Position.—Hooker succeeds Burnside.—Federal Advance.—Description of Chancellorsville.—Lee's Movements.—The Federals Driven Back.—Last Interview of Lee and Jackson.—The Flank Movement.—The Federal Defeat.—Jackson Wounded.—The Battle of the 3d.—Hooker Withdraws.—Sedgwick's Advance.—He is Defeated and Recrosses the River.—Results of the Battle.—Life and Character of Jackson.—Reorganization of the Army.—Financial Difficulties of the Government.

THE Army of Northern Virginia in the winter of 1862-63 began to feel seriously the want of judicious legislation. There had neither been formed an adequate plan for recruiting the army, nor had a reliable financial system been adopted. When the country was full of enthusiasm the ranks of the army were filled by voluntary enlistment, but when the novelty of war disappeared and the depreciating value of the pay of the soldier was seen, this mode could no longer be relied on, and it became necessary to resort to conscription. This measure, being regarded by many as too despotic for a republic, was taken hold of with reluctance, but after much delay and fruitless discussion Congress in 1862 passed a conscript act as the only means that could be devised for the preservation of the army.

Having neglected at the beginning of the war to take advantage of the abundant resources of the country to establish a firm financial basis upon which the pecuniary demands of the country could safely rest, the Confederate legislators were obliged, in order to meet the demand upon the treasury, to resort to a system of inflation, without providing for a corresponding reflux of the fiscal tide to the treasury; consequently, each new issue was followed by a proportionate decline in the value of the currency.

Besides the want of money and men, the Army of Northern

Virginia was deficient in clothing, shoes, blankets, tents, provisions; in fact, everything needful was wanted except arms and ammunition. The abundant supplies with which the country teemed at the beginning of the war, instead of being collected and preserved for future use, were allowed to be dissipated, and in less than two years one of the most fruitful countries known was reduced to the condition of being barely able to afford a scanty subsistence for armies whose effective strength did not exceed 200,000 men. Besides the inclemency of the season, scant clothing, and short rations, the proximity of the Federal army required them to be always prepared for battle.

At this time the necessities of the army were greatly relieved by voluntary contributions from patriotic citizens throughout the country. The embarrassments of General Lee were further increased by having to fill the ranks of the army, which were becoming diminished by discharges from the expiration of the term of enlistment. In order to relieve the drain upon the scanty commissariat, Longstreet was sent with two divisions to the district south of Petersburg, where provisions were still abundant, with a view of subsisting these troops, while they collected the surplus supplies to be sent to the troops in other quarters. This detachment reduced the Confederate army to barely 40,000 men, while the Federal force exceeded 100,000.

After this reduction General Lee conceived the design of adopting a position more remote from the Federal lines than the one he then occupied, where his army might enjoy greater repose than it could in its position about Fredericksburg, and where he would have greater scope to manoeuvre when the enemy should advance, and be better able to secure the fruit of any advantage he might gain in battle. With this aim he directed Colonel Long and Colonel Venable of his staff to make a careful examination of the country contiguous to the North Anna River, from the neighborhood of Hanover Junction to a point twenty-five or thirty miles above that place, to ascertain the character of the south bank of that stream as a defensive position. These officers, after making the examination as directed, reported adversely to the North Anna. As no position could be found which afforded greater advantages than

the one he then occupied, Lee continued to hold the line of the Rappahannock, and busied himself in preparation for the ensuing campaign.

Many of the troops whose term of enlistment had expired, from motives of patriotism and devotion to their commander, and others who had honorably served, rather than be subjected to conscription, voluntarily re-enlisted for the war upon receiving a short furlough to visit their homes. By these reductions the army was at one time reduced to a little above 30,000 men. By the exercise of his influence and authority General Lee caused the ranks of his army to be rapidly filled, so that by the last of April it numbered, exclusive of the two divisions of Longstreet, then absent, 45,000 men of all arms.\*

The appointment of Hooker to the command of the Army of the Potomac was a surprise to General Lee, who had no great respect for the military ability of his new opponent in a position of such importance. Swinton thus comments on the condition of the Army of the Potomac and the appointment of Hooker to the supreme command:

"Notwithstanding the untoward fortunes the Army of the Potomac had suffered, it could hardly be said to be really demoralized, for its heart was still in the war; it never failed to respond to any demand made upon it; and it was ever ready to renew its courage at the first ray of hope. Such a day-spring came with the appointment of General Hooker to the chief command, and under his influence the tone of the army underwent a change that would appear astonishing had not its elastic vitality been so often proved. Hooker's measures of reform were judicious: he cut away the roots of many evils; stopped desertion and its causes; did away with the nuisance of the 'grand-division' organization; infused vitality through the staff and administrative service; gave distinctive badges to the different corps; instituted a system of furloughs; consolidated the cavalry under able leaders, and soon enabled it not only to

\* Colonel Taylor, in his *Four Years with General Lee*, places the Confederate force on the 31st of March at 57,000; he makes no allowance, however, for changes that might have occurred during April, nor for detachments serving elsewhere, but borne upon the the returns of the Army of Northern Virginia.

stand upon an equality with, but to assert its superiority over, the Virginia horsemen of Stuart. These things proved General Hooker to be an able administrative officer, but they did not prove him to be a competent commander for a great army, and whatever anticipation might be formed touching this had to be drawn from his previous career as a corps commander, in which he had won the reputation of being what is called a 'dashing' officer, and carried the sobriquet of 'Fighting Joe.'

"The new commander judiciously resolved to defer all grand military operations during the wet season, and the first three months after he assumed command were well spent in rehabilitating the army. The ranks were filled up by the return of absentees; the discipline and instruction of the troops were energetically continued; and the close of April found the Army of the Potomac in a high degree of efficiency in all arms. It numbered 120,000 men (infantry and artillery), with a body of 12,000 well-equipped cavalry and a powerful artillery force of above 400 guns. It was divided into seven corps—the First corps under General Reynolds; the Second under General Couch; the Third under General Sickles; the Fifth under General Meade; the Sixth under General Sedgwick; the Eleventh under General Howard; and the Twelfth under General Slocum."

During his period of preparation Hooker very properly resisted that spirit of impatience that had characterized Mr. Lincoln in his intercourse with the previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac, and only gratified once that "up-and-be-doing" spirit that prevailed in Washington by indulging General Averill in a cavalry combat with General Fitz Lee, who guarded the upper fords of the Rappahannock. Being now fully prepared for active operations, Hooker determined to take the initiative by moving on the left of his opponent's position. By careful study of Lee's position he correctly concluded that his left was his most vulnerable point.

In order to mask his real design he sent forward a force of 10,000 cavalry under General Stoneman to operate upon Lee's lines of communication with Richmond, and sent Sedgwick with a force of 30,000 men still further to mask his movement.

Sweeney crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the 29th and Sigelwick appeared on the 30th on the heights below Fredericksburg. These preparatory measures having been taken, Hunter proceeded to the execution of his plan. Swinton gives a picturesque description of the passage of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, tells us "that on the afternoon of the 30th of April the corps of the Federal army had gained the position of Chancellorsville, where Hunter at the same time established his headquarters."

Chancellorsville is situated one mile south-west of Fredericksburg. It is not as its name implies a town or village but simply a farm-house with its usual appendages situated at the edge of a small field surrounded by a dense thicket of second growth which stands up after the prominent tree had been cut to forest and is a neighboring furnace. This thicket extends in miles in every direction and its wild aspect may properly suggest its name, The Wilderness. The intersection of several important roads gives it the semblance of strategic importance, while it really a more mortifying place for military operations than I can well be imagined.

Early, however, seemed well pleased with his acquisition of an earthen Chancellorsville on Thursday night he issued an order to the troops in which he announced that "the enemy have cut my retreat" for it stood due from behind his forces and gave no hope of our own ground where certain disastrous events had. "This house we are to be so much in the eye of it," Early was inclined in the whole extent of his conversation. "The Confederacy will" said he "be now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac. They must be well used or their horses and mules or themselves and I shall be after them." etc.

There has been only one of the negotiations that were very clear in its intent, the battle of Fredericksburg, and that was a full and frank meeting of the two in the open air. The reason is, in effect, during the winter the Army is ignorant of what the opponent has in store, "you" who gives me right away to the command a few days, while the other commands a few months before a full knowledge of the Army, State, Plan




Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the 29th, and Sedgwick appeared on the 28th on the heights below Fredericksburg. These preparatory measures having been taken, Hooker proceeded to the execution of his plan. Swinton, after a picturesque description of the passage of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, tells us "that on the afternoon of the 30th of April four corps of the Federal army had gained the position of Chancellorsville, where Hooker at the same time established his headquarters."

Chancellorsville is situated ten miles south-west of Fredericksburg. It is not, as its name implies, a town or village, but simply a farm-house with its usual appendages, situated at the edge of a small field surrounded by a dense thicket of second growth, which sprang up after the primeval forest had been cut to furnish fuel to a neighboring furnace. This thicket extends for miles in every direction, and its wild aspect very properly suggests its name, The Wilderness. The intersection of several important roads gives it the semblance of strategic importance, while in reality a more unfavorable place for military operations could not well be found.

Hooker, however, seemed well pleased with his acquisition, for on reaching Chancellorsville on Thursday night he issued an order to the troops in which he announced that "the enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him." This boast, we are told, so much in the style of Hooker, was amplified by the whole tenor of his conversation. "The Confederate army," said he, "is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac. They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for Richmond, and I shall be after them," etc.

General Lee was fully aware of the preparations that were being made by his adversary, but calmly awaited the complete development of his plans before exerting his strength to oppose him. The presence of the enemy during the winter had made it necessary to maintain a defensive line of about twenty-five miles, the right being in the vicinity of Port Royal, while the left extended to the neighborhood of the United States Ford.





This line was occupied by six divisions: Anderson's on the left, and McLaws's between Fredericksburg and the Massaponax, while the four divisions of Jackson's corps occupied the space below the Massaponax. This line had been greatly attenuated by the removal of Longstreet's two divisions of 15,000 men.

Lee's whole cavalry force consisted of two brigades—Fitz Lee's and W. H. F. Lee's—under the immediate command of Stuart, and was mainly employed in guarding the fords of the upper Rappahannock. Hooker had no sooner commenced his movement than it was reported by Stuart to General Lee, and Sedgwick's appearance on the 28th came under his own observation. Perceiving that the time for action had arrived, Lee ordered Jackson to concentrate his whole corps in the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg.

Early on the morning of the 29th, Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock below the mouth of Deep Run, but made no other aggressive movement on that day or the day following. On the night of the 30th, Lee was informed of Hooker's arrival at Chancellorsville. He had been previously informed of Stoneman's movements against his line of operations by General Stuart, and was now satisfied that the main attack of the enemy would come from the direction of Chancellorsville. Therefore on the morning of the 1st of May he made the necessary preparations to meet it. Accompanied by his staff, he took a position on a height where one of his batteries overlooked the Rappahannock. He there observed carefully the position of Sedgwick while waiting for information from the direction of Chancellorsville. Jackson was present, while his troops occupied the telegraph road. As far as the eye could reach these men with their bright muskets and tarnished uniforms were distributed in picturesque groups, lightly chatting and laughing, and awaiting the order to march.

Very soon the sound of cannon indicated that the work had begun. At the same time couriers arrived from Stuart and Anderson informing the general that the enemy were advancing on the old turnpike, the plank road, and on the river roads, and asking for reinforcements. McLaws was immediately ordered to the support of Anderson, and shortly after Jackson

was ordered to follow with three of his divisions, leaving Early with his division, Barksdale's brigade, and the reserve artillery under General Pendleton—a force of about 9000 men and 45 pieces of artillery—in observation of Sedgwick. When Jackson joined McLaws and Anderson a lively skirmish was in progress, in which he immediately participated. When General Lee arrived he found the Federals were being driven back to Chancellorsville. At the close of the afternoon they had retired within their lines.

General Lee occupied the ridge about three-quarters of a mile south-east and south of Chancellorsville. The opposing armies were hidden from each other by the intervening thicket of brushwood. By a close examination it was discovered that the Federal position was protected by two strong lines of breastworks, one fronting east and the other south. The brushwood had been cleared off for a space of a hundred yards, thus giving an unobstructed field for musketry, while the roads were commanded by artillery. Toward the north and west the position was open. It was obvious that the Federal position was too formidable to be attacked in front with any hope of success; therefore Lee proceeded to devise a plan by which the position of Hooker might be turned and a point of attack gained from which no danger was apprehended by the Federal commander.

General Lee was informed that the Rev. Mr. Lacy, a chaplain in Jackson's corps, was familiar with the country about Chancellorsville. Mr. Lacy informed the general that he had been the pastor of a church near Chancellorsville, and was well acquainted with all the roads in that neighborhood, and that troops could be conducted to a designated point beyond Chancellorsville by a road sufficiently remote from the Federal position to prevent discovery. With this information Lee determined to turn the Federal position and assail it from a point where an attack was unexpected. The execution of a movement so much in accordance with his genius and inclination was assigned to General Jackson, Captain Carter acting as guide.

The above statement is made from personal knowledge of

the writer, gained on the ground at the time ; still, since some of Jackson's biographers have allowed their partiality for him so far to outstrip their knowledge of facts as to claim for him the origin of that movement, I will introduce, in corroboration of my statement, the following letter from General Lee published in the address of General Fitzhugh Lee before the Southern Historical Society :

"LEXINGTON, VA., October 28, 1867.

"DR. A. T. BLEDSOE, Office *Southern Review*, Baltimore,  
Maryland.

"MY DEAR SIR : In reply to your inquiry, I must acknowledge that I have not read the article on Chancellorsville in the last number of the *Southern Review*, nor have I read any of the books published on either side since the termination of hostilities. I have as yet felt no desire to revive any recollections of those events, and have been satisfied with the knowledge I possessed of what transpired. I have, however, learned from others that the various authors of the life of Jackson award to him the credit of the success gained by the Army of Northern Virginia when he was present, and describe the movements of his corps or command as independent of the general plan of operations and undertaken at his own suggestion and upon his own responsibility. I have the greatest reluctance to do anything that might be considered detracting from his well-deserved fame, for I believe no one was more convinced of his worth or appreciated him more highly than myself; yet your knowledge of military affairs, if you have none of the events themselves, will teach you that this could not have been so. Every movement of an army must be well considered and properly ordered, and every one who knew General Jackson must know that he was too good a soldier to violate this fundamental principle. In the operations around Chancellorsville I overtook General Jackson, who had been placed in command of the advance as the skirmishers of the approaching armies met, advanced with the troops to the Federal line of defences, and was on the field until their whole army recrossed the Rappahannock. There is no question as

to who was responsible for the operations of the Confederates, or to whom any failure would have been charged.

"What I have said is for your own information. With my best wishes for the success of the *Southern Review* and for your own welfare, in both of which I take a lively interest,

. "I am, with great respect, your friend and servant,

"R. E. LEE."

The last interview between Lee and Jackson, during which this important movement was decided upon, was an occasion of great historical interest, in regard to which the writer is fortunately able to add some information from his own knowledge of the circumstances, and that of other members of General Lee's staff. He has been favored by Major T. M. R. Talcott with certain important details of this event, conveyed in a private letter, from which the following extract is made:

"My recollections of the night before the battle of Chancellorsville are briefly as follows:

"About sunset General Jackson sent word to General Lee (by me) that his advance was checked and that the enemy was in force at Chancellorsville. This brought General Lee to the front, and General Jackson met him in the south-east angle of the Chancellorsville and Catharine Forge roads.

"General Lee asked General Jackson whether he had ascertained the position and strength of the enemy on our left, to which General Jackson replied by stating the result of an attack made by Stuart's cavalry near Catharine Forge about dusk. The position of the enemy immediately in front was then discussed, and Captain Boswell and myself were sent to make a moonlight reconnaissance, the result of which was reported about 10 P. M., and was not favorable to an attack in front.

"At this time Generals Lee and Jackson were together, and Lee, who had a map before him, asked Jackson, 'How can we get at these people?' To which Jackson replied, in effect, 'You know best. Show me what to do, and we will try to do it.' General Lee looked thoughtfully at the map; then indicated on it and explained the movement he desired General Jackson to make, and closed by saying, 'General Stuart will cover

your movement with his cavalry.' General Jackson listened attentively, and his face lighted up with a smile while General Lee was speaking. Then rising and touching his cap, he said, 'My troops will move at four o'clock.'"

Having, in the manner here described, settled upon their plan of operations for the ensuing day, the two generals, accompanied by their staff officers, repaired to a neighboring pine-thicket, where an open space, well sheltered by overhanging boughs, afforded the party a good bivouac. The day having been a fatiguing one, they lost little time in preparing for the night's repose. Each selected his ground for a bed, spread his saddle-blanket, substituted his saddle for a pillow and his overcoat for covering, and was soon in a happy state of oblivion.

At dawn on the morning of the 2d, Jackson's corps, 22,000 strong, was in motion, and while it was making one of the most famous flank movements on record, General Lee, with the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, with 20 pieces of artillery, a force not exceeding 12,000 men, occupied the position he had assumed the previous evening, and General Hooker, with 90,000 men, lay behind his breastworks awaiting the Confederate attack. Having in the forenoon seen a part of Jackson's ammunition-train, Hooker believed that Lee was retreating, and sent two divisions of Sickles's corps and Pleasonton's cavalry to gain information. This movement was promptly arrested by Colonel Thompson Brown with his battalion of artillery, supported by Jackson's rear-guard. Sickles's and Pleasonton's cavalry lingered about Catharine Furnace in a state of uncertainty until recalled by Jackson's attack on the right of the Federal position.

After making a circuitous march of fifteen miles, Jackson reached a point on the Orange Court-house road three miles in the rear of Chancellorsville. Had Hooker possessed a handful of cavalry equal in spirit to the "Virginia horsemen" under W. H. F. Lee that neutralized Stoneman's ten thousand, he might have escaped the peril that now awaited him. On the arrival of Jackson on the plank road, Fitz Lee, who had covered his movement with his brigade of cavalry, conducted him

to a position from which he obtained a view of the enemy, which disclosed the following scene:

"Below and but a few hundred yards distant ran the Federal line of battle. There was the line of defence, with abatis in front and long lines of stacked arms in rear. Two cannons were visible in the part of the line seen. The soldiers were in groups in the rear, laughing, chatting, and smoking, probably engaged here and there in games of cards and other amusements indulged in while feeling safe and comfortable, awaiting orders. In the rear of them were other parties driving up and butchering beeves."

Returning from this point of observation, Jackson proceeded to make his dispositions of attack, which by six o'clock were completed. The divisions of Rodes and Colston were formed at right angles to the old turnpike, the division of Rodes being in advance, and the division of A. P. Hill, in column on the road, formed the reserve.

Howard's corps was first assailed. This corps, being surprised, was panic-stricken and fled precipitately, and in its flight communicated the panic to the troops through which it passed. Jackson's forces followed, routing line after line, until arrested by the close of day. The rout of the Federal army was fast becoming general, and it was only saved from entire defeat by the interposition of night. When compelled to halt Jackson remarked that with one more hour of daylight he could have completed the destruction of the Federal army.

This, the most famous of all Jackson's brilliant achievements, closed his military career. After his troops had halted, and while the lines were being adjusted, he rode forward with several of his staff to reconnoitre the Federal position. It was then after nine o'clock at night. The moon faintly illuminated the scene, but floating clouds dimmed its light. The battle had ceased, and deep silence reigned over what recently had been the scene of war's fiercest turmoil. The reconnoitering party rode several hundred yards in advance of the lines, and halted to listen for any sounds that might come from the direction of the enemy, when suddenly a volley was poured into them from the right of the road. They had been mistaken

for Federal scouts by the Confederate infantry. Some of the party fell, and Jackson wheeled his horse in the wood in dread of a renewal of the fire.

This movement proved an unfortunate one. It brought him directly in front of, and not twenty paces from, a portion of his own men, who had been warned against a possible attack from the Federal cavalry. A volley saluted him, with the unfortunate effect of wounding him in three places—two bullets striking his left arm, and one his right hand. At this moment his left hand held the bridle, while his right was held erect, perhaps to protect his face from boughs, yet seemingly with the peculiar gesture which he frequently used in battle. When the bullets struck him his wounded hand dropped, but he instantly seized the bridle with his bleeding right hand, while the frightened horse wheeled and darted through the wood. As he did so the limb of a pine tree struck Jackson in the face, hurled off his cap, and nearly flung him to the ground. Retaining his seat with difficulty, he reached the road and his own lines, where he was assisted to dismount by Captain Wilbourn, one of his staff officers, who laid him at the foot of a tree.

He was soon afterward supported to the rear by his officers, and, becoming so weak as to be unable to walk, was placed in a litter and borne from the field. His last order, as he was being carried back, was given to General Pender, who had expressed doubts of being able to hold his position. The eyes of the wounded hero flashed as he energetically replied, "You *must* hold your ground, General Pender! You *must* hold your ground, sir!"

The discharge of musketry provoked a terrible response from the Federal batteries, which swept the ground as Jackson was being borne from the field. During this movement one of the bearers stumbled and let fall his end of the litter. A groan of agony came from the wounded man, and in the moonlight his face looked deathly pale. On being asked, however, if he was much hurt, he replied, "No, my friend; don't trouble yourself about me."

There is an incident of considerable interest in relation to

the wounding of General Jackson which has never yet been told, yet is worthy of being put on record as one of those remarkable coincidences which have so often happened in the lives of great men. On the morning of May 2d, Jackson was the first to rise from the bivouac above described, and, observing a staff officer (General W. N. Pendleton) without cover, he spread over him his own overcoat. The morning being chilly, he drew near a small fire that had been kindled by a courier, and the writer, who soon after sought the same place, found him seated on a cracker-box. He complained of the cold, and, as the cooks were preparing breakfast, I managed to procure him a cup of hot coffee, which by good fortune our cook was able to provide.

While we were still talking the general's sword, which was leaning against a tree, without *apparent* cause fell with a clank to the ground. I picked it up and handed it to him. He thanked me and buckled it on. It was now about dawn, the troops were on the march, and our bivouac was all astir. After a few words with General Lee he mounted his horse and rode off. This was the last meeting of Lee and Jackson.

I have spoken of the falling of Jackson's sword because it strongly impressed me at the time as an omen of evil—an indefinable superstition such as sometimes affects persons on the falling of a picture or mirror. This feeling haunted me the whole day, and when the tidings of Jackson's wound reached my ears it was without surprise that I heard this unfortunate confirmation of the superstitious fears with which I had been so oppressed.

After the fall of Jackson the command fell to General Stuart, who was co-operating with him, and was the senior officer present, General A. P. Hill having been wounded at the same time with Jackson. About midnight Lee received from Stuart the report both of Jackson's wound and his success. Instructions were sent to Stuart to continue what had been so successfully begun, and Anderson was directed to support him, while McLaws threatened Hooker's right.

Early on the morning of the 3d the attack was resumed by the Confederates with great vigor. Hooker, taking advantage

of the night, had restored order in his army and strengthened his position; his troops regained courage and contested the field with great stubbornness until ten o'clock, when they yielded at every point and rapidly retreated before the impetuous assaults of Rodes, Heth, Pender, Doles, Archer, and other gallant leaders within a strong line of defences which had been previously constructed to cover the road to the United States Ford, their line of communication with the north side of the Rappahannock. When Stuart assumed the direction of affairs on the night of the 2d the command of the cavalry devolved on Fitz Lee, who operated with vigor on the flanks of the enemy during the continuance of the operations about Chancellorsville.

General Lee's part in this battle of the 3d can be best described in the words of Colonel Charles Marshall, in his eloquent address at the Soldiers' Memorial Meeting in Baltimore:

"General Lee accompanied the troops in person, and as they emerged from the fierce combat they had waged in 'the depths of that tangled wilderness,' driving the superior forces of the enemy before them across the open ground, he rode into their midst. The scene is one that can never be effaced from the minds of those that witnessed it. The troops were pressing forward with all the ardor and enthusiasm of combat. The white smoke of musketry fringed the front of the line of battle, while the artillery on the hills in the rear of the infantry shook the earth with its thunder and filled the air with the wild shrieks of the shells that plunged into the masses of the retreating foe. To add greater horror and sublimity to the scene, the Chancellorsville house and the woods surrounding it were wrapped in flames. In the midst of this awful scene General Lee, mounted upon that horse which we all remember so well, rode to the front of his advancing battalions. His presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable outbursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who have not witnessed them.

"The fierce soldiers, with their faces blackened with the smoke of battle, the wounded, crawling with feeble limbs from the fury of the devouring flames, all seemed possessed with a common impulse. One long, unbroken cheer, in which the

feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the earth blended with the strong voices of those who still fought, rose high above the roar of battle and hailed the presence of the victorious chief. He sat in the full realization of all that soldiers dream of—triumph; and as I looked on him in the complete fruition of the success which his genius, courage, and confidence in his army had won, I thought that it must have been from some such scene that men in ancient days ascended to the dignity of the gods.

"His first care was for the wounded of both armies, and he was among the foremost at the burning mansion, where some of them lay. But at that moment, when the transports of his victorious troops were drowning the roar of battle with acclamations, a note was brought to him from General Jackson. It was brought to General Lee as he sat on his horse near the Chancellorsville house, and, unable to open it with his gauntleted hands, he passed it to me with directions to read it to him. The note made no mention of the wound which General Jackson had received, but congratulated General Lee upon the great victory.

"I shall never forget the look of pain and anguish that passed over his face as he listened. With a voice broken with emotion he bade me say to General Jackson that the victory was his, and that the congratulations were due to him. I do not know how others may regard this incident, but for myself, as I gave expression to the thoughts of his exalted mind, I forgot the genius that won the day in my reverence for the generosity that refused its glory."

The troops being much fatigued and having accomplished all that could have been expected of them, Lee caused a suspension of further operations in order that they might rest and refresh themselves preparatory for the final blow. While the operations above described were in progress at Chancellorsville, General Early by skilful manœuvring had detained Sedgwick at Fredericksburg until the 3d, when that general, by a determined advance, forced back Early, carried Marye's Heights, and proceeded toward Chancellorsville. The condition of affairs was communicated to General Lee during the forenoon.

Wilcox's brigade, then at Banks's Ford, was ordered to intercept Sedgwick and retard his advance, while McLaws's division was ordered to support him. Wilcox on reaching Salem Church, six miles from Chancellorsville, encountered the Federal advance, and after a sharp conflict he repulsed it with loss.

The success of Wilcox delayed Sedgwick until Anderson and McLaws could come up. The premeditated attack on Hooker being thus interrupted, Lee on the forenoon of the 4th repaired to the neighborhood of Fredericksburg. A combined attack was then directed to be made by Early on the rear, while McLaws and Anderson bore down upon the front. The battle was hotly contested during the afternoon, in which the forces of Sedgwick were defeated, and were only saved from destruction by a night-passage across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford. On the 5th, Lee collected his forces at Chancellorsville to give the *coup de grâce* to Hooker, but that general, under cover of a dark and stormy night, effected his retreat beyond the Rappahannock at the United States Ford.

The losses sustained at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg were estimated at the time at 20,000 killed and wounded, and among the wounded was General Hooker, besides a large number of prisoners. Swinton places Hooker's loss at Chancellorsville at 17,000; Sedgwick's loss at Fredericksburg must have considerably increased that number. The loss sustained by the Confederates was proportionately as great as that of the Federals. The casualties reported were about 9000. After expressing his praise and admiration for the heroic conduct of his troops, and after mentioning the names of a large number of line officers whose zeal and gallantry entitled them to special notice, General Lee thus concludes his report:

"The loss of the enemy in the battle of Chancellorsville and the other engagements was severe. His dead and a large number of wounded were left on the field. About 5000 prisoners exclusive of the wounded were taken, and 13 pieces of artillery, 19,500 stands of arms, 17 colors, and a large quantity of ammunition fell into our hands. To the members of my staff I am greatly indebted for assistance in observing the movements of the enemy, posting troops, and conveying or-

ders. On so extended and varied a field all were called into requisition and all evinced the greatest energy and zeal. The medical director of the army, Surgeon Guild, with the officers of his department, were untiring in their attention to the wounded. Lieutenant-colonel Corley, chief quartermaster, took charge of the disposition and safety of the trains of the army. Lieutenant-colonel Cole, chief commissary of subsistence, and Lieutenant-colonel Baldwin, chief of ordnance, were everywhere on the field attending to the wants of their departments; General Chilton, chief of staff, Lieutenant-colonel Murray, Major Peyton, and Captain Young, of the adjutant-and inspector-general's department, were active in seeing to the execution of orders; Lieutenant-colonel Smith and Captain Johnston of the Engineers in reconnoitering the enemy and constructing batteries; Colonel Long in posting troops and artillery; Majors Taylor, Talcott, Marshall, and Venable were engaged night and day in watching the operations, carrying orders, etc.

"Respectfully submitted,                    R. E. LEE, *General.*

"*NOTE.*—Notwithstanding the unfavorable character of the country for the use of artillery, Colonels Brown, Carter, and Hardaway succeeded in placing thirty or forty guns in position to be used with effect on parts of the enemy's position, especially that in the vicinity of the Chancellor house."

On the 7th, General Lee ordered his troops to resume their former position about Fredericksburg. A few days after the sad intelligence of the death of Lieutenant-general Jackson reached the army. The estimation in which that distinguished officer was held will be best explained by the general orders of the commander-in-chief announcing his death to the army:

"General Orders No. 61.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
May 11, 1862.

"With deep regret the commanding general announces to the army the death of Lieutenant-general T. J. Jackson, who expired on the 10th instant at a quarter past 3 P. M. The daring, skill, and energy of this great and good soldier by the decree of an all-wise Providence are now lost us. But while

we mourn his death we feel that his spirit still lives, and will inspire the whole army with his indomitable courage and unshaken confidence in God as our hope and strength. Let his name be a watchword to his corps, who have followed him to victory on so many fields. Let his officers and soldiers emulate his invincible determination to do everything in the defence of our beloved country.

"R. E. LEE, *General.*"

It is but just to pause at this point in our narrative, and append some remarks upon the appearance and character of the remarkable man whose striking history ends with the field of Chancellorsville and with the achievement of a victory in which he was the chief instrument, under the skilful control of the great Confederate leader.

The writer first knew Jackson as a young man, then an officer in the First Artillery. Shortly after that time he retired from the army and became a professor in the Virginia Military Institute, which he left to join the army of the Confederacy. I next saw him in Richmond when on a brief visit to Lee to consult in regard to the projected movement against McClellan. [He seemed then in much better health than before he left the United States army, but presented the same tall, gaunt, awkward figure and the rusty gray dress and still rustier gray forage-cap by which he was distinguished from the spruce young officers under him. There was nothing of a very striking character in his personal appearance. He had a good face, but one that promised no unusual powers. Yet in the excitement of battle his countenance would light up and his form appear to expand, a peculiar animation seeming to infuse itself through his whole person. At the battle of Gaines's Mill, where I next saw him, he was very poorly mounted on an old sorrel horse, and in his rusty suit was anything but a striking figure. And yet as he put himself at the head of his last regiment and advanced with his face lit up with the enthusiasm of war, he looked truly heroic and appeared a man made by Nature to lead armies to victory.]

I saw him frequently afterward during the progress of the

war, and in the march against Harper's Ferry I wrote off the order for the movement. The conversation in regard to it between Lee and Jackson took place in my presence, and I well remember not only his strong approval of it, but also the earnest energy with which he undertook the enterprise. He at that time seemed improved in health, and was more animated than usual in manner. It was in the camp near Winchester, however, that Jackson presented his most attractive appearance. General Stuart had made him a present of a new uniform, and a handsome horse in place of his old raw-boned sorrel. It was with some difficulty that he was induced to part with his ancient attire in favor of this new and showy dress, and it is doubtful if he was ever quite comfortable in it.

[He was a very reticent man, and ordinarily seemed absorbed in his own thoughts, while he displayed some marked peculiarities of manner.] One of these was a strange habit of stopping and throwing up his hands, as if in supplication to the Invisible.

[In religion he was a strict Presbyterian of the sternest creed, and very attentive to religious observances. He not only believed in predestination, but had a strong belief in his personal safety—a presentiment that he would never fall by the hands of the enemy that seemed singularly warranted by the result. The men under his command were to a considerable extent of his own faith.] In this he presented a parallel with Cromwell, whom, indeed, he resembled in character.

[Jackson was very hospitable in disposition and welcomed warmly any guest to his tent or his table. The writer has often partaken of his hospitality, and found him ever an agreeable and generous host. As for himself, he was very abstemious.] He had been at one period of his life a decided dyspeptic, and was always obliged to be very careful of his diet.

In this work the greater part of his military history has been included, yet no description has been given of that notable Valley campaign in which he so greatly astounded his adversaries, and to which he owes so much of his reputation as a brilliant tactician and a commander of extraordinary powers. This campaign formed no part of the military history of General Lee, and it is but alluded to here as a fitting close to this

tribute to the most remarkable, and one of the most able, of the great champions developed during our Civil War.

After the return of the victorious army to its old quarters at Fredericksburg the remainder of May was consumed in recruiting and reorganizing. The infantry was formed into three corps of three divisions each. The First corps was commanded by Longstreet, the Second by Ewell, and the Third by A. P. Hill. Each of these officers had been elevated to the rank of lieutenant-general. The organization of the cavalry remained unchanged, but that of the artillery demanded the special attention of the commander-in-chief. The artillery of the army consisted of about sixty batteries of light artillery and of six batteries of horse artillery, whose *personnel* was unsurpassed by any troops in the army, though they were imperfectly organized. General Lee, having determined to improve the efficiency of his artillery, directed a plan to be drafted for its more perfect organization. The plan presented and adopted was to group the artillery of the army into battalions of four batteries each. The artillery of the line was thus formed into fifteen battalions, besides the battalion of horse artillery. To each battalion was assigned a lieutenant-colonel and major, and two or three battalions constituted the command of a colonel. The whole light artillery of the army was separated into three divisions, each of which was commanded by a chief with the rank of brigadier-general. One of these divisions was assigned to each corps of infantry. The chiefs of the corps of artillery reported and received orders direct from the corps commanders, and the chief of artillery of the army reported direct to the commander-in-chief. This organization proved entirely successful, and the Confederate artillery became famous in the later campaigns.

By the 1st of June the reconstruction and equipment of the army was completed, and the Army of Northern Virginia appeared the best disciplined, the most high-spirited, and enthusiastic army on the continent. It consisted of 52,000 infantry, 250 pieces of artillery, and 9000 cavalry, making an aggregate force of 65,000 men. The successful campaign which this army had recently passed through inspired it with almost



## CHAPTER XV.

### GETTYSBURG.

A New Plan of Operations Discussed.—The Army Advances.—Through Shenandoah Valley to the Potomac.—The Federals March North.—Hooker Superseded by Meade.—The Army in Pennsylvania.—General Order.—Both Armies Move upon Gettysburg.—The Battle of July 1st.—An Assault Ordered for the Next Morning.—Criticism of the Count of Paris.—Topography.—Stuart's Movement.—Lee's Anxiety at the Delay.—An Opportunity Lost.—Position of Sickles's Corps.—A Dash for Little Round Top.—The Texans Repulsed.—The Fight at the Peach Orchard.—Federal Repulse.—Ewell's Assault.—The Battle of the 3d.—An Attack Ordered on the Centre.—Pickett's Charge.—Failure of the Assault.—Colonel Taylor's Testimony.—Lee's Letter to Pickett.—After the Battle.—Retreat to the Potomac.—Advance of the Federal Army.—Lee Crosses the Potomac.—Subsequent Movements.—Venable's Anecdote.—Story of a Federal Soldier.

BY the first of June General Lee had completed his arrangements for the ensuing campaign. The army, though numerically less than it was when he commenced his operations against McClellan on the Chickahominy, had been by its recent victories imbued with a confidence that greatly increased its efficiency. Its spirit was now high, and it was anxious to grapple again its powerful foe, which still lingered on the Stafford Heights.

The object of the campaign being the defence of Richmond, General Lee could either continue on the defensive and oppose the Federal advance as he had recently done, or he might assume the offensive and by bold manoeuvring oblige the Federal army to recede from its present line of operations to protect its capital or oppose the invasion of Maryland or Pennsylvania. The advance upon Richmond would thus be frustrated, and the attack upon that city delayed, at least for a time. The dispirited condition of the Federal army since its late defeat, and the high tone of that of the Confederates, induced the adoption of the latter plan.

This decision was reached by General Lee near the close of

May and after the completion of the reorganization of the army which followed the battle of Chancellorsville. Before the movement began his plans of operation were fully matured, and with such precision that the exact locality at which a conflict with the enemy was expected to take place was indicated on his map. This locality was the town of Gettysburg, the scene of the subsequent great battle.

At the period mentioned he called the writer into his tent, headquarters being then near Fredericksburg. On entering I found that he had a map spread on the table before him, which he seemed to have been earnestly consulting. He advised me of his designed plan of operations, which we discussed together and commented upon the probable result. He traced on the map the proposed route of the army and its destination in Pennsylvania, while in his quietly effective manner he made clear to me his plans for the campaign. He first proposed, in furtherance of his design, to manœuvre the army in such a way as to draw Hooker from the Rappahannock. At this point in the conversation I suggested that it might be advantageous to bring Hooker to an engagement somewhere in the vicinity of the old battlefield of Manassas. To this idea General Lee objected, and stated as his reason for opposing it that no results of decisive value to the Confederate States could come from a victory in that locality. The Federal army, if defeated, would fall back to the defences of Washington, as on previous occasions, where it could reorganize in safety and again take the field in full force.

In his view, the best course would be to invade Pennsylvania, penetrating this State in the direction of Chambersburg, York, or Gettysburg. He might be forced to give battle at one or the other of these places as circumstances might suggest, but, in his view, the vicinity of Gettysburg was much the best point, as it was less distant from his base on the Potomac, and was so situated that by holding the passes of the South Mountain he would be able to keep open his line of communication. York, being some twenty-five miles farther from the mountains, was a less desirable locality.

In this plan he had a decided object. There was in his

mind no thought of reaching Philadelphia, as was subsequently feared in the North. Yet he was satisfied that the Federal army, if defeated in a pitched battle, would be seriously disorganized and forced to retreat across the Susquehanna—an event which would give him control of Maryland and Western Pennsylvania, and probably of West Virginia, while it would very likely cause the fall of Washington City and the flight of the Federal Government. Moreover, an important diversion would be made in favor of the Western department, where the affairs of the Confederacy were on the decline. These highly important results, which would in all probability follow a successful battle, fully warranted, in his opinion, the hazard of an invasion of the North.

The plan which he thus indicated was already fully matured in his own mind, and the whole line of movement was laid down on the map. He alluded to the several strategic points in Maryland, but did not think it would be advisable to make any stand in that State, for the same reason as before given. This interview took place about two weeks before the movement began. The proposed scheme of operations was submitted to President Davis in a personal interview, and fully approved by him.

General Lee entertained the reasonable expectation that with his powerful cavalry he would be able to obtain all necessary supplies in Pennsylvania. It was his intention to subsist his soldiers on the country of the enemy, and he knew that the fertile Cumberland Valley could supply an army of any size. He had strong confidence of success in this movement, relying greatly on the high spirit of his army and the depressed condition of Hooker's forces. Everything, indeed, seemed to promise success, and the joyful animation with which the men marched North after the movement actually began and the destination of the army was communicated to them appeared a true presage of victory.

Since the battle of Chancellorsville, although the Federal army had been increased to its former dimensions, it still retained a spiritless attitude. As yet no future plan of operations had been developed. It was just to conclude that General

Hooker would not again advance on his present line, and that a change of base was in contemplation, and as the James and York presented the most propitious lines, it was probable that the Army of the Potomac, if left uninterrupted, would move in that direction. But the arrival of the advance of the Confederate army early in June at Culpeper Court-house excited the apprehensions of the Federal authorities for the safety of their capital, and forced them to entertain new ideas as to the destination of the Army of the Potomac.

On the 2d of June, Ewell's corps, preceded by the cavalry, was sent forward to Culpeper Court-house. A day or two after, Longstreet, accompanied by the commander-in-chief, followed Ewell, while Hill remained at Fredericksburg to observe the movements of Hooker. By the 8th of June the main body of the Confederate army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Culpeper and the Federal army was in motion for the upper Rappahannock.

Early on the morning of the 9th, Pleasonton's cavalry crossed the Rappahannock and attacked Stuart in his position south of that river. A fierce engagement ensued, in which the Confederate cavalry was roughly handled, but finally, with the assistance of Rodes's division of infantry, the Federals were repulsed and forced to cross the Rappahannock.

Having learned by this encounter that Lee was in force at Culpeper, Hooker hastened the concentration of his forces in the neighborhood of Rappahannock Station. On the 10th, Ewell was advanced toward the Shenandoah Valley, both for the purpose of expelling from that section a considerable Federal force, and to create an impression of a flank movement with the view of interrupting Hooker's communications. Having not yet recovered from the shock he had received at Chancellorsville, and having before him the picture of Pope's disaster of the previous year, Hooker suddenly withdrew from the Rappahannock and retired to the vicinity of Manassas and Centreville, where he assumed a defensive attitude for the protection of Washington.

Thus by a series of bold strategic movements General Lee removed the enemy from his path and accomplished the most

difficult step in his plan of operations without opposition. The extension of his line from Fredericksburg to Winchester in the face of an enemy of more than double his numerical strength would ordinarily be considered an act of unpardonable rashness, but on the present occasion, being aware of the dispirited condition of the Federal army and the dread of disaster to Washington, Lee felt safe in undertaking this movement.

General Ewell on the 14th defeated Milroy at Winchester, and after expelling him from the Valley took a position on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry. Hill, as soon as the enemy disappeared from his front, withdrew from Fredericksburg and proceeded to close upon the main body of the army.

On the 15th, Longstreet was put in motion for the Valley, and Hill was directed to follow a day later, while Stuart was left east of the Blue Ridge with instructions to observe closely the movements of the enemy.

General Lee arrived with Longstreet's corps at Berryville on the 18th, where he remained two or three days perfecting his preparations for the invasion of Pennsylvania. About the 21st he continued his advance in two columns: the one, composed of the corps of Ewell and Hill, was directed to Shepherdstown, and the other, consisting of Longstreet's corps and the supply-train, proceeded to Williamsport. Ewell crossed the Potomac on the 23d, followed by Hill on the 24th, while its passage was effected by Longstreet and the trains on the 25th at Williamsport.

As Lee's plan of operations unfolded itself, Hooker advanced to the Potomac and took possession of the fords in the neighborhood of Leesburg. When he learned that Lee had entered Maryland he immediately crossed the river and advanced to Frederick. A controversy then occurred between Halleck and himself, which resulted in his removal on the 27th and the placing of General Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac.

Previous to the passage of the Potomac, General Stuart was instructed to make the movements of the cavalry correspond with those of the Federal army, so that he might be in position

to observe and report all important information. In the performance of this duty Stuart had never failed, and probably his great confidence in him made Lee less specific in his instructions than he would otherwise have been. But on this occasion, either from the misapprehension of instructions or the love of the éclat of a bold raid, Stuart, instead of maintaining his appropriate position between the armies, placed himself on the right flank of the enemy, where his communication with Lee was effectually severed. This greatly embarrassed the movements of General Lee, and eventually forced him to an engagement under disadvantageous circumstances.

Immediately on completing the passage of the Potomac, Lee resumed his advance, directing Ewell to Carlisle, while he proceeded with Longstreet and Hill to Chambersburg. Ewell sent Early to York by way of Gettysburg, and then moved with the rest of his corps, accompanied by Jenkins's cavalry, to Carlisle. These places were occupied without opposition. Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg on the 26th, when they were halted to wait tidings of Stuart and to gain information of the movements of the enemy. Such was the disposition of the Confederate army during the latter part of June.

On the day succeeding his arrival at Chambersburg, General Lee issued the following order to his army, which breathes the same highly commendable spirit as that issued on the occasion of the advance into Maryland:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
“CHAMBERSBURG, Pa., June 27, 1863.

“GENERAL ORDER NO. 73.

“The commanding general has observed with marked satisfaction the conduct of the troops on the march, and confidently anticipates results commensurate with the high spirit they have manifested. No troops could have displayed greater fortitude or better performed the arduous marches of the past ten days. Their conduct in other respects has, with few exceptions, been in keeping with their character as soldiers, and entitles them to approbation and praise.

“There have, however, been instances of forgetfulness on

the part of some that they have in keeping the yet unsullied reputation of the army, and that the duties exacted of us by civilization and Christianity are not less obligatory in the country of the enemy than in our own. The commanding general considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the innocent and defenceless and the wanton destruction of private property that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country. Such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetrators and all connected with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of the army and destructive of the ends of our present movements. It must be remembered that we make war only on armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemy, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain.

"The commanding general therefore earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain, with most scrupulous care, from unnecessary or wanton injury to private property, and he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and bring to summary punishment all who shall in any way offend against the orders on this subject.

"R. E. LEE,  
"General."

To the strict observance of the above order Colonel Freemantle, of the British army, thus testifies: "I saw no straggling into the houses, nor were any of the inhabitants disturbed or annoyed by the soldiers. . . . I went into Chambersburg again, and witnessed the singular good behavior of the troops toward the citizens. . . . To one who has seen, as I have, the ravages of the Northern troops in Southern towns this forbearance seems most commendable and surprising."

Colonel Freemantle was also on the field of Gettysburg, and behaved most handsomely on the repulse of Pickett's division. Speaking of that affair, he says: "General Lee and his officers were fully impressed with a sense of the situation, yet there

was much less noise, fuss, or confusion of orders than at an ordinary field-day. The men, as they were rallied in the wood, were brought up in detachments and lay down quietly and coolly in the positions assigned them."

By referring to the map of Pennsylvania it will be seen that Chambersburg, Carlisle, and York are nearly equidistant from Gettysburg, each being about twenty-five miles distant from that place. When General Lee arrived at Chambersburg he had received no intelligence from Stuart for several days, consequently he had no information of the movements of the Army of the Potomac, and the continued want of intelligence for several days longer greatly embarrassed him.

Lee first learned of the appointment of General Meade to the command of the Federal army on the 28th of June. He was surprised to hear of such a change of commanders being made at that critical stage of affairs. The change itself he considered advantageous to the Federal cause, as he had always held Meade in much higher estimation as a commander than Hooker. But he was of the opinion that the difficulties which would beset Meade in taking command of an army in the midst of a campaign would more than counterbalance his superiority as a general over the previous commander. He was therefore rather satisfied than otherwise by the change. The army at large was in no sense discomposed in learning that General Lee was opposed to a new adversary. They had known the same thing to happen on several previous occasions with rather loss than gain to the Federal cause, and the news tended to add to their hopes of success. They had little fear that any of the generals of the Army of the Potomac would prove a match for their own admired and almost worshipped leader.

On reaching Chambersburg, General Lee, not having heard from Stuart, was under the impression that the Federal army had not yet crossed the Potomac. It was not until the night of the 28th that he learned that the enemy had reached Frederick. This important information was brought by a scout from Hood's Texas brigade.

On receiving this news Lee immediately ordered the advance of Robertson's and W. E. Jones's divisions of cavalry, which

Stuart had left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge. This cavalry, however, did not arrive in time to be of any service in the movements preceding the battle.

The rapid advance of General Meade was unexpected, and exhibited a celerity that had not hitherto been displayed by the Federal army. A speedy concentration of the Confederate army was now necessary. Before dawn on the morning of the 29th orders were despatched requiring the immediate junction of the army, and on the 30th the Confederate forces were in motion toward Gettysburg. At the same time General Meade was pressing forward for that place.

This movement of the Confederate army began with the advance of A. P. Hill's corps, which bivouacked near Greenville on the night of the 29th, and reached Cashtown during the next day. Orders had been sent to Ewell to recall his advanced divisions and concentrate in the same locality. Longstreet's corps followed on the 30th, accompanied by headquarters, and encamped that night near the western base of South Mountain, in the neighborhood of the Stevens furnace. On July 1st he advanced to Cashtown, a locality about six miles from Gettysburg.

While Lee and his staff were ascending South Mountain firing was heard from the direction of Gettysburg. This caused Lee some little uneasiness. The unfortunate absence of the cavalry prevented him from knowing the position and movements of the enemy, and it was impossible to estimate the true condition of affairs in his front. He was at first persuaded that the firing indicated a cavalry affair of minor importance, but by the time Cashtown was reached the sound had become heavy and continuous, and indicated a severe engagement.

General Lee now exhibited a degree of anxiety and impatience, and expressed regret at the absence of the cavalry. He said that he had been kept in the dark ever since crossing the Potomac, and intimated that Stuart's disappearance had materially hampered the movements and disorganized the plans of the campaign.

In a short time, however, his suspense was relieved by a message from A. P. Hill, who reported that he was engaged